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In a recent paper, Demange (2004) has shown that hierarchical organizations can guarantee 
the existence of stable cooperative outcomes by appropriately allocating the blocking power 
to a subset of coalitions, the “teams”. This paper extends the analysis of Demange to 
cooperative problems with spillovers. We show that if blocking coalitions have “pessimistic 
expectations” on the reaction of outsiders, in all cooperative problems there exists an 
allocation which is blocked by no team. We also study the case of ”passive expectations”, 
for which the same result holds in all games with negative spillovers, while stable 
allocations may fail to exist in games with positive spillovers. In the latter class of games, 
however, hierarchies are shown to be the most stable organizational forms. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Formal economic organizations arise as “means to achieve the beneﬁts of collective action
in situations in which the price system fails” (Arrow, (1974)). Among the possible forms of
organization, hierarchies are by far the most widespread in economic, social and political life.
Formally, a hierarchy can be represented as a pyramidal network: a ”principal” is at the top
of the organization, and each organizational member has a unique direct superior. The chain
of authority is such that each other organizational member has a unique path of intermediate
superiors through which he can communicate with the principal.
In a recent paper, Demange (2004) has proposed new and insightful elements for a the-
oretical explanation of the emergence of hierarchies. Diﬀerently from most works on the
subject, which focus on the design of eﬃcient organizational forms1, Demange (2004) stud-
ies the eﬀect of a hierarchical order on the stability of cooperation. Taking a core-theoretic
approach to the problem, Demange focuses on the constraints that the hierarchy imposes
on the ability of subsets of players to organize in coalitions and to object to (or to ”block”)
a collective decision taken by the organization.2 By forcing players to report to a common
superior, the hierarchy endows only special coalitions - the ”teams” - to act autonomously of
the rest of the organization. Teams have the desired property of containing a player which
is superior in the hierarchy to all other team members and, as such, can coordinate their ac-
tions. Demange shows that to all cooperative problems we can associate a collective decision,
called ”hierarchical outcome”, which is blocked by no team in the hierarchy.
In Demange (2004), the payoﬀ possibilities of each team are entirely determined by the
actions taken by its members. If utility is transferable, the cooperative situations studied by
Demange can be represented as games in characteristic function. Many important instances
of cooperative decision making do not, however, satisfy this assumption. On the contrary, it
is often the case that the payoﬀ possibilities of a coalition depend also on the actions taken
by the players outside the coalition. These ”spillovers” arise in many economic and political
cooperative situations where hierarchies are a widespread forms of organization and stability
is a relevant issue.
1See the early contribution of Coase (1937), and, more receintly, Williamson (1975) and the subsequent
extensive literature, surveyed in Milgrom and Roberts (1992).
2A prior investigation of group stability when only a subclass of coalitions are eﬀective in raising objections
(the ”basic” coalitions) is contained in Kaneko and Wooders (1982) and, for a very simple form of hierarchy,
in Greenberg and Weber (1983).
2In vertically integrated industries, for instance, major companies may have an incentive
to divest some of their production units to independent companies. The case of AT&T,
giving up its equipment division, and General Motors, giving up its auto part division, are
two eminent recent examples of an intrinsic instability of the vertically integrated structure.
Within the boundaries of the ﬁrm, another main source of instability is the incentives of
employees to make use of the training obtained within the ﬁrm to start their own independent
business, often in competition with their former employers. The case of Silicon Valley (and,
in general, of the high-tech industry) is a documented example where engineers and other
professionals often change ﬁrms or quit their jobs to start ﬁrms of their own, bringing with
them projects and licences. When an engineer involves in his new independent project his
own close collaborators, such defection take the form of ”team blocking” in the sense made
clear above. Political competition is still another example in which relevant spillovers from
coalition formation coexist with alliances which are internally organized as trees (think, for
instance, of the order of parties’ ideological positions on the left-right arrow).3
This paper extends Demange (2004) analysis to include such cooperative situation with
spillovers. In order to maintain the stability analysis based on the primitive notion of ”coali-
tional blocking”, speciﬁc assumptions on the expected reaction of outside players need to be
introduced, where by reaction we mean the conﬁguration of outside players in coalitions after
the blocking. A formulation of reactions which are endogenously determined by the strate-
gic interaction among coalitions has motivated several recent papers in the coalition theory
literature (see, among others, Ray and Vohra (1997)). In this paper we do not attempt such
a task, by rely on exogenous assumption about players expectations.
We ﬁrst study the case in which blocking coalitions form ”pessimistic expectations”,
in the sense that they consider the maximal payoﬀ they can guarantee to their members
independently of the organization of outsiders. The use of these guarantee levels dates back
to Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) analysis of games in normal form and has recently
been adapted by Funaki and Yamato (1999) to problems of coalition formation. We show in
3Although political alliance may not be endowed with a clear hierarchical order, still teams can be identiﬁed
with coalitions which are consecutive in the ideological order. In fact Demange’s results can be reformulated
by replacing the notion of a team (based on the hierarchical order) by the notion of an ”internally connected”
c o a l i t i o n( b a s e do nt h ea r c h i t e c t u r eo ft h en e t w o r kd e ﬁning the internal organization of a coalition). In the
absence of a hierarchical order, the restriction of blocking power to connected coalitions is justiﬁed in terms
of communication and coordination possibilities.
3Theorem 1 that Demange’s result fully extends: whenever agents face gains from cooperation,
the hierarchical outcome is blocked by no team, independently of the shape of spillovers.
We establish this result also for the case in which the ”punishment” of blocking coalitions
is limited by the constraints imposed by the hierarchy on the coordination possibilities of
outsiders.4
We then turn to a less extreme form of expectations, with blocking coalitions expecting to
get the maximal feasible payoﬀ compatible with the prediction that outsiders will maintain
the same bilateral relations that shape the hierarchical structure, and cooperate according to
such relations. In other words, the hierarchy is taken as given by agents, and fully determine
both their ability to coordinate on blocking and their ability to cooperate after blocking has
taken place (in Ichiishi’s (1997) terminology, these ”passive expectations” underlie the notion
of Strong Nash Equilibrium in normal form games).
With respect to the case of pessimistic expectations, this case is characterized by more
proﬁtable coalitional objections, and the stability result of Demange (2004) does not extend
in general. However, we show in Proposition 2 that all hierarchies are stable in all problems
with negative spillovers.5 Although no stable allocation may exist under positive spillovers6,
Proposition 2 shows that hierarchies remain the most stable organizational forms in the
following sense: all allocations that are stable for some non hierarchical organization must
be stable for some hierarchical organization as well.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the concepts and notation. Section
3 presents the main results. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Games in Partition Function Form
We consider a set N = {1,2,...,n} of agents, called the grand coalition, with generic member
i ∈ N. A coalition is any subset S of N. For all S ⊆ N,w ed e n o t eb yΠS the set of all
partitions πS of the set S, that is, all collections {B1,B 2,...,B m} of subsets of S with empty
4These constraints are the same that justify the restriction of blocking power to teams.
5Negative spillovers arise when the formation of a coalition (or the merger of more coalitions) hurt the
other players in the system.(as, for instance, in custom unions and cost reducing R&D alliances).
6Positive spillovers arise when the formation of a coalition beneﬁts other players, as in public good games
and Cournot oligopoly.
4pairwise intersection and whose union coincides with S. A partition πS ∈ ΠS is also called a
coalition structure on S.
Letting π ∈ ΠN and S ∈ π, we call the pair (S,π) an embedded coalition. A partition
function maps each embedded coalition (S,π) into a real number v(S,π), denoting the ag-
gregate payoﬀ generated by coalition S when embedded in partition π. With slight abuse of
n o t a t i o n ,w ew i l lw r i t ev(π)f o r
P
B∈π
v(B,π) .G i v e na ne m b e d d e dc o a l i t i o n( S,π), we denote
by π\S the partition of the set N\S obtained by considering all the elements of π except S.
A partition function accounts for the fact that a coalition’s payoﬀ possibilities may depend
on the conﬁguration of other coalitions. Two classes of partition functions have played a
central role in the literature, and cover many well known cooperative problems. These classes
refer to the sign of the welfare eﬀect exerted on a coalition S by a ”concentration” of the
coalition structure adopted by players in N\S. The notion of concentration is deﬁned as
follows:7
Deﬁnition 1 Let S ⊆ N. The partition π ∈ ΠS is a concentration of π0 ∈ ΠS if π 6= π0 and
if it is possible to originate π by merging elements of π0.F o r m a l l y ,π is a concentration of π0





Deﬁnition 2 The partition function v exhibits positive spillovers if v(S,π) ≥ v(S,π0)
whenever π is a concentration of π0.
Deﬁnition 3 The partition function v exhibits negative spillovers if v(S,π) ≤ v(S,π0)
whenever π is a concentration of π0.
A partition function is cohesive when the grand coalition generates more value than any
other coalition structure.
Deﬁnition 4 The function v is cohesive if for all partitions π ∈ ΠN:
v(N,{N}) ≥ v(π).
7The deﬁnition given by Yi (1997) and used in other works i nt h el i t e r a t u r e( s e ef o ri n s t a n c et h es u r v e y s
by Bloch (1997, 2003)), makes use of the notion of concentration of a partition, and is more general than the
one used here.
5Full cohesiveness is a stronger condition, requiring that each coalition generates a higher
value than any of its partitions, for any coalition structure in which it may be embedded. In
deﬁning this property, and elsewhere in the paper, we will use the superadditive cover ˆ v of

















Deﬁnition 5 The function v is fully cohesive if for all embedded coalitions (S,π) and all
¯ πS ∈ ΠS :
v(S,π) ≥ ˆ v(S,{¯ πS,π\S}).
The diﬀerent requirements imposed by cohesiveness and full cohesiveness deserve further
discussion. Cohesiveness basically requires that coordination of individual strategies is always
(weakly) better than the absence of cooperation. For instance, it requires that a monopolistic
cartel generates more aggregate proﬁt than any other market structure. It would be indeed
diﬃcult to argue that the members of the cartel are not allowed to replicate the same strategies
they would play in any other market structure. Full cohesiveness, in contrast, may fail because
of the interplay between diﬀerent coalitions. So, two Cournot triopolist may generate a higher
(Nash Equilibrium) aggregate proﬁt than if they merged to form a duopoly. Although after
merging they would be able to replicate the equilibrium strategy they played as triopolists,
these strategies may fail to be part of the equilibrium of the duopoly game, from which the
failure of full cohesiveness.
2.2 Graphs and Hierarchies
We now introduce some basic concepts, borrowed from the theory of graphs, that will allow
us to formally represent the hierarchical organizations adopted by the grand coalition N.
2.2.1 Graphs
Given a set of vertices N,agraph (or network) g on N is deﬁned as any subset of the set of
all (unordered) pairs of vertices in N:
g ⊆ {ij : i ∈ N and j ∈ N,i 6= j}.
The pair ij ∈ g is called a ”link”, and the link ij is called ”incident” to vertices i and j.
The set of vertices that are incident to at least one link in the graph g is denoted by N(g).
6The graph g is connected if for all pairs of vertices i and j in N there exists a connecting
path P(i,j), that is, a set of vertices {i1,i 2,...,i k} such that i = i1, j = ik,a n dipip+1 ∈ g for
all p =1 ,...,k−1. A coalition S ⊂ N is connected in g if for all pairs of vertices i and j in S
there exists a connecting path P(i,j)i ng all included in S. The set of connected coalitions
in g is denoted by CC(g). Given the graph g with vertex set N, the graph h with vertex set
S ⊆ N is a subgraph of g if h ⊆ g. The subgraph h of g is a component of g if it is connected
and if for all i ∈ N(h)a n dj/ ∈ N(h)w eh a v eij / ∈ g.
2.2.2 Connected graphs as organizations
I fw ei n t e r p r e te a c hp l a y e ri nt h ep l a y e r s ’s e tN as a vertex, the connected graph g on N can be
viewed as the organizational form through which the grandcoalition achieves coordination. As
suggested by Myerson (1977), the graph can be thought of as describing the communication
possibilities of players in N, directly implying that the set of players N acts as a ”coalition”,
in the sense of cooperative game theory, if and only if g is connected. More generally, the
set C(g) of components of a disconnected graph g describes a set of coexisting organizations.
We can express the coalitions of cooperating players in a graph g through the associated
partition π (g), uniquely obtained as follows:
π(g)={N(h):h ∈ C(g)}. (1)
It will be sometimes useful to refer to the restriction g|S of a graph g to the subset of
vertices S ⊂ N; the restricted graph g|S has vertex set S and contains all the links (and only
those) of g that are not incident to vertices in N\S.
2.2.3 Trees and hierarchies
The graph g contains a cycle if there exists a path P(i,j)i ng that contains at least three
vertices and for which i = j. A connected graph containing no cycle is called a tree (or
minimally connected graph). The tree g is a ”spanning tree” of the connected graph g0 if
N(g)=N(g0)a n dg ⊂ g0.
It is possible to interpret trees as hierarchies by selecting a vertex r and deﬁning the
partial order Âg,r on N as follows:
j Âg,r k ⇐⇒ k ∈ P(r,j).
7Since r Âg,r k for all k ∈ N, r is the top element of the order Âg,r.W es a yt h a tr is the root
of the hierarchy. For all other vertices j an k we read j Âg,r k as ”j follows k in g with root
r”.
Deﬁnition 6 A hierarchy is a pair (g,r),w h e r eg is a tree deﬁned on the set of vertices N
and r ∈ N.
We say that vertex k is a direct superior of vertex j if j Âg,r k and jk ∈ g.W ew i l ld e n o t e
by Fg(i) the set of all vertices that follow vertex i in g, including vertex i itself (see ﬁgure 1
below). For each S ⊂ N,w ed e n o t eb yDg(S)t h es e to fdirect followers of S in g,t h a ti s ,
those vertices that are not in S but whose direct superior belongs to S. Finally, we denote
by Tg the set of terminal vertices in the hierarchy g, that is, those vertices with no followers.
It is clear that every connected coalition S in a tree g deﬁnes a restricted graph g|S which
is itself a tree. Once we have speciﬁes a root r for g, then every connected coalition S deﬁnes a
new hierarchy (g|S,i(S)), where i(S) is the uniquely deﬁned vertex in S which is not followed
by any vertex in S. Following Demange (2004), we will refer to such connected coalitions as
teams (see Figure 1 below). Note that the set of teams of a hierarchy is independent of the





Figure 1: A Hierarchy
82.3 Feasible and Eﬃcient Allocations
Ap a y o ﬀ allocation for the grand coalition N is a vector u ∈ Rn
+ of individual payoﬀsf o rt h e
members of N. The allocation u is feasible under partition function v is there exists a way
in which the players in N can partition themselves and generate the values distributed by u.
Deﬁnition 7 The payoﬀ allocation u ∈ Rn
+ is feasible under partition function v if there
exists a coalition structure π ∈ ΠN such that
P
i∈B
ui ≤ v(B,π) for all B ∈ π. In this case we
say that π supports u.
Note that the organizational form(s) adopted by players does not enter the above deﬁn-
ition. Having deﬁned payoﬀ possibilities in terms of a partition function we have implicitly
assumed that the type of hierarchical structure adopted by players does not aﬀect the aggre-
gate payoﬀ they can generate by cooperating.
Among feasible allocations we will focus on those which are eﬃcient in the sense of the
following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 8 The feasible payoﬀ allocation u ∈ Rn
+ is eﬃcient under partition function v if
there exists no other feasible allocation u0 for which u0
i >u i for all i ∈ N.
If the function v is cohesive, then the grand coalition supports all eﬃcient allocations.
3 Stability
In this section we establish a set of results that extend the stability features of hierarchies
proved in Demange (2004) to games in partition function.
3.1 Games Without Spillovers: Demange’s Result
The analysis of Demange (2004) takes as primitive the claims that each coalition S has on
aggregate payoﬀs. Such claims are measured by the feasible allocations that the members of
S can guarantee themselves by acting without the cooperation of the players in N\S.I n
Demange (2004), these allocations are fully determined by the set of actions available to the
members of S. In a context of transferable utility, these claims can be expressed in terms of
a a ”characteristic function” φ, mapping each coalition S ⊆ N into a real number φ(S). The
9function φ is a special case of a partition function v for which v(S,π)=v(S,π0)f o ra l lπ and
π0.
If any pair of disjoint coalitions increase their claims by acting together, the function φ
is said to be superadditive.
Deﬁnition 9 T h ec h a r a c t e r i s t i cf u n c t i o nφ is superadditive if for all S ⊂ N and T ⊂ N
such that S ∩ T = ∅ the following inequality holds:
φ(S)+φ(T) ≤ φ(S ∪ T).
Claims deﬁne the incentives of each coalition to ”block” any proposed payoﬀ allocation
for the grand coalition.





When all coalitions have the ”ability” to block, the set of unblocked allocations deﬁnes
the core of the associated cooperative game (N,φ).
The main point raised by Demange (2004) is that the hierarchical structure (and, more
in general, any internal organization adopted by the grand coalition) may limit the block-
ing ability of certain coalitions by limiting the possibility that their members communicate
without the help of players outside the coalition. In Demange’s paper, this ability is assigned
only to the set of ”teams” in the hierarchy (see section 2.2.3), in which a common superior
coordinate the joint blocking decision. Demange (2004) has shown that a speciﬁca l l o c a t i o n ,
called the ”hierarchical outcome”, distributes the eﬃcient aggregate payoﬀ in such a way that
the claims of all teams are satisﬁed. When the characteristic function φ is superadditive, the
hierarchical outcome u ∈ Rn
+ associated with the hierarchy (g,r) is obtained as follows: each
terminal player i ∈ Tg is allocated the payoﬀ ui = φ({i}). Any player i/ ∈ Tg is allocated the




Theorem 1 (Theorem 1 in Demange (2004)). Let φ be superadditive. The hierarchical
outcome associated with the hierarchy (g,r) is not blocked by any team in g.
Theorem 2 in Demange’s paper studies the case of non superadditive decision problems.
It is there shown that a variation of the hierarchical outcome described above is not blocked
10by any team and is supported by some partition of the set of players N. We discuss this
possibility after proposition 1 in the next section.
3.2 Games with Spillovers: Pessimistic Expectations
When a hierarchical organization operates in the presence of spillovers, the claim of each
blocking coalition does not depend solely on the actions available to its members, but also
on the actions that the other players in the organization are expected to take in case of
blocking. Speciﬁc assumptions are needed on the coalition structure that would be induced
as a consequence of each coalitional blocking.
In this section we study the case of ”pessimistic expectations”, ﬁrst suggested by von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) for games in normal form and recently applied to the
analysis of games in partition function form by Funaki and Yamato (1999).8 The spirit of
pessimistic expectations is to assume that each blocking coalition considers as its claim the
maximal payoﬀ it can guarantee to its members, independently of the reaction of outsiders.













Remark 1 Deﬁnition (2) implicitly says that even if S decides to split in the coalition
structure πS, the players in S are still able to commit to any sort of transfers, independently
of the subcoalition they end up belonging to in πS. This assumption obviously gives stronger
incentives to block than if such transfers were not allowed. However, since the results of
propositions 1 and 2 will prove the existence of unblocked allocations, the same result would
a fortiori hold if transfers were not allowed.
Remark 2 Pessimistic expectations take a clear-cut form in the classes of games with nega-
tive and positive spillovers. In the ﬁrst class, players in N\S are expected to stay together in
one united coalition; in the second, these players are expected to split up into the singletons
partition of the set N\S. We will return to these two classes of games and on the role of
expectations in the section 3.3.
8See also Hart and Kurz (1983), deﬁning the α − core and the β − core of games of coalition formation.
11Remark 3 Both the members of S and of N\S are allowed to partition themselves in any
arbitrary way, independently of the starting hierarchical structure g. In certain applications,
where the constraint on coordination imposed by the graph g s u r v i v ea f t e rt h eb l o c k i n go fS,
this assumption may not be appropriate, and both the optimal choice of S and the reaction
of N\S should be subject to the existing coordination possibilities.
The deﬁnition of the function φ can be modiﬁed in order to account for the observations
raised in remark 3. For any tree g and any coalition C ⊂ N,w ed e n o t eb yΠ
g
C the set of
partitions πC ∈ ΠC that are also subpartitions of π(g|C) (the partition derived from g by
considering the set of components of the restricted graph g|C). So, every element of πC is
either an element or a subset of some element of π (g|C). The claim of a blocking coalition S
















Note that we cannot say whether a coalition S is made better by blocking under character-
istic functions φ or under φg.I nf a c t ,w h i l et h eﬁrst allows for more eﬀective ”punishments”
by N\S, the second restricts the set of possibilities of S.
The following proposition extends theorem 1 to all games in partition function form, for
both the associated characteristic functions φ and φg.
Proposition 1 The characteristic functions φ and φg are superadditive for all partition func-
tions v.
Proof. We prove the result for the function φ. All steps are valid for function φg as well.
For any set C ⊂ N,d e ﬁne the function fC : ΠC → ΠN\C as follows:9









Consider now any pair of disjoint coalitions S, T. We need to show that
φ(S)+φ(T) ≤ φ(S ∪ T). (5)









whenever πN\C 6=¯ πN\C. This assumption can be easily dropped at
the cost of a lenghtier proof.
12Deﬁnition (2) applied to S ∪ T gives:
φ(S ∪ T)= m a x
π(S∪T)∈Π(S∪T)
ˆ v(S ∪ T,{πS∪T,f S∪T(πS∪T)}). (6)
We can therefore write:
φ(S ∪ T) ≥ max
(πS,πT)∈ΠS×ΠT
ˆ v(S ∪ T,{πS,π T,f(πS,π T)}). (7)
Consider now the values φ(S)a n dφ(T). Denote by ˆ πS and ˆ πT the partitions of S and T
that originate such values:
ˆ πS =a r g m a x
πS∈ΠS
ˆ v(S,{πS,f S (πS)}); (8)
ˆ πT =a r g m a x
πT∈ΠT
ˆ v(T,{πT,f T (πT)}).
By deﬁnition of the functions φ and fS∪T, the following inequalities hold:
φ(S) ≤ ˆ v(S,{ˆ πS, ˆ πT,f S∪T(ˆ πS, ˆ πT)}); (9)
φ(T) ≤ ˆ v(T,{ˆ πS, ˆ πT,f S∪T(ˆ πS, ˆ πT)})..
Inequalities (7) and (9) directly imply:
φ(S ∪ T) ≥ max
(πS,πT)∈ΠS×ΠT
ˆ v(S ∪ T,{πS,π T,f(πS,π T)}) ≥
≥ ˆ v(S,{ˆ πS, ˆ πT,f S∪T(ˆ πS, ˆ πT)})+ˆ v(T,{ˆ πS, ˆ πT,f S∪T(ˆ πS, ˆ πT)}) ≥ φ(S)+φ(T).
T h ef a c tt h a tf u n c t i o n sφ and φg are superadditive does not, without further restrictions
on v, ensure that the hierarchical outcomes associated with such functions deﬁne feasible
payoﬀ imputations in the sense of deﬁnition 7. In fact, if v is not cohesive, then the parti-
tions π∗ and π∗
g that generate the values φ(N)a n dφg(N) may contain more than one set.
Deﬁnitions 7 would require therefore that the hierarchical outcomes satisfy the requirement
that each coalition B ∈ π∗ (resp., B ∈ π∗






. However, as shown in the next example, this is not true in general because
of the eﬀect of spillovers.





13In this case the hierarchical outcome u for φg allocates to 3 less than the value generated by
3i nπ∗
g, violating deﬁnition 7:






This problem is due to the very deﬁnitions of φ(N)a n do fφg(N), which implicitly assume
that transfers across elements of π∗ and π∗
g are possible, while such transfers are not allowed
by deﬁnition 7. For this reason, in the next theorem we need to impose that v is cohesive,
thereby ensuring that no transfers across coalitions are needed at the hierarchical outcome.
We remark, however, that cohesiveness of v does not require a superadditivity property for
all coalitions (as, in contrast, would be required by full cohesiveness), but only that maximal
gains from trade are exploited by the grand coalition.
Theorem 2 Let g be a tree with set of vertex N,a n dl e tv be a cohesive partition function.
For all r ∈ N, if coalitional claims are measured by the characteristic function φ (resp., by
φg), the hierarchical outcome associated with the hierarchy (g,r) and with φ (resp., with φg)
is a feasible payoﬀ allocation supported by the grandcoalition and is blocked by no team in g.
Proof. Cohesiveness of v implies that {N} ∈ argmaxπ∈ΠN v(π). Superadditivity of the
functions φ and φg imply that the hierarchical outcome allocates a non negative payoﬀ to all
players and that it exactly exhausts the value v(N,{N}). The fact that hierarchical outcomes
are not blocked by any team in g is directly implied by Proposition 1 and Theorem 1.
Note, ﬁnally, that transfers across coalitions are implicit in the deﬁnitions of φ(S)a n d
of φg(S) for any coalition S ⊂ N. Although such transfers imply a violation of deﬁnition 7
for the reasons made clear above, the overstatement of the blocking power of coalitions that
derives from this violation reinforces the stability result of theorem 1.
We conclude this section by applying the above analysis to three simple examples of
vertical integration, political competition and international cooperation. While the ﬁrst
application is derived in full detail, the other two are brieﬂy sketched.
Example 2 Vertical Integration - Consider three vertically integrated ﬁrms, A, B and R.
Firms A and B jointly produce a consumption good to be sold on the market by ﬁrm R (the
retailer). Firm A buys inputs on a competitive factor market at constant marginal cost c,
and produces an intermediate good xA that ﬁrm B uses as input. Firm B transforms each
14unit of good xA into one unit of ﬁnal good. Firm R ﬁnally markets the ﬁnal good. The
produced goods are speciﬁc to the integrated ﬁrms, in the sense that there is no alternative
market for these goods outside the vertical structure. The vertically integrated structure acts
as a monopolist and makes the monopolist proﬁt uM.Ap a y o ﬀ allocation for the vertically
integrated ﬁrm is any distribution of uM among the three ﬁrms. Blocking is here identiﬁed
with the decision to opt out of the vertically integrated structure and to act independently
of what remains of it. For instance, the retailer may opt out by deciding to buy the ﬁnal
good from B, to market the good and to receive the proﬁts. Also, ﬁrms A and B may jointly
opt out of the vertical structure and sell their output to ﬁrm R. Similarly, ﬁrms B and R
can opt out, buy the intermediate input from ﬁrm A and sell the ﬁnal good on the market.
However, ﬁrms A and R cannot exert the same threat, since they cannot jointly produce
anything without the contribution of ﬁrm B.
We derive the partition function for this problem by looking at the equilibrium proﬁts in
the price setting game in which ﬁrms move sequentially according to the vertical structure
A,B,R. For all proper partitions of N, we will assume that upstream ﬁrms set their prices
ﬁrst, and that the demand for the ﬁnal good is given by 1 − pR. We obtain the following
values.










































We then derive function φg for this problem. Expectations do not play any role in deter-
mining the claims of coalitions AB, BR and B. Pessimistic expectations are instead used to

















15The function φg is superadditive, and theorem 2 directly implies that the hierarchical
outcome is not blocked by any connected coalition of ﬁrms. To appreciate the role of the
hierarchy in generating stable allocations, consider what would happen if disconnected coali-
tions could block. To obtain the claim of the disconnected coalition AR we cannot simply
vertically integrate these two ﬁrms, since this is not technologically feasible by assumption.
We could however allow A and R to collude on prices. So, ﬁrm R sets its price given the prices
set by A and B; ﬁrm B sets pB given pA; ﬁrm A sets pA so as to maximize the aggregate
proﬁto fA and R, given the optimal reactions of B and R. Simple computations give us
the following prices and proﬁts: pA = 2c+1
3 , pB = 2+c




Note that although the function φg is superadditive, the core of the game (N,φg)i se m p t y .
In fact, the core constraints for coalitions AB, BR and AR imply that






Example 3 Political Alliances. - Consider a political alliance in which parties L, M and R
are ordered on a one dimensional spectrum of ideological positions. The alliance has to take
decisions on various issues, on which parties may have diﬀerent opinions. If a party or a
subset of parties is not happy with a proposed decision, it can threaten to defect from the
alliance. However, while a restricted alliance between parties L and M could be envisaged, an
alliance between L and R may not credible without the mediation of M. This situation can
be modeled by assuming that there is some ﬁxed utility ¯ u from being in power, from which
each party i has to subtract the square of the distance between the chosen policy x and its
preferred policy xi. If we assume that ¯ u is small enough we obtain that the aggregate utility
of coalition (LR) is always negative, while the aggregate value of the three party alliance and
of every other two party alliance is strictly positive. Under these circumstances, exiting the
alliance is likely to be less attractive for R than for M, the former having to face a larger
and more powerful competitor. The game has therefore negative spillovers.
Example 4 International Cooperation: At the international level, bilateral relations be-
tween countries are characterized by diﬀerent degrees of trust and friendship. An agreement
to increase domestic production of an international public good (e.g., abatement of polluting
emissions) is possible only if cooperating countries are connected in the ”trust” network. This
16constraint applies both to the global cooperation process (involving the grand coalition) and
to possible objections (involving subcoalitions of participants proposing alternative partial
agreements or inaction). Suppose that each country i has a utility function q + xi,d e ﬁned
on the aggregate internationally produced public good q and a private good consumption xi.
The public good is produced by each country with strictly convex cost function c(qi), where
qi is the production of public good of country i,a n dq ≡
P
i qi (all countries are therefore
symmetric). Given some initial endowment of private good, in the absence of cooperation
each country chooses qi to maximize the function q − c(qi) with respect to qi.I f a g i v e n
partition π emerges, each element B of π acts as a single player, maximizing the aggregate
utility of the set of countries in B. Suppose there is one country j that all countries trust
and which trusts all countries, but no other links are present in the trust network (which has
therefore a ”star” architecture, with central vertex j). The game has positive spillovers, and
the worst coalition structure for a blocking coalition S is the one in which all countries in N\S
split up into singletons. Moreover, the game is cohesive. Therefore, the stable hierarchical
outcome associated with the hierarchy that has j as root vertex allocates to all countries but
j their utility level at the non cooperative equilibrium, while country j obtains all the gains
from cooperation. In all other hierarchies (that is, for all other choices of the root), country
j still gets some gain from cooperation by virtue of its central position (by which it is never
a terminal vertex of the network).
3.3 Games with Spillovers: Passive Expectations
Although under pessimistic expectations coalitional claims have the natural interpretation of
”guarantee levels”, other more optimistic behavioural principles can be envisaged. Players
may think, for instance, that the links within the organization will stay on for some time
after the objection. This may be a good assumption when the hierarchy is made of exogenous
and ﬁxed communication or technological constraints.
Such ”passive expectations” (see Ichiishi (1997)) generate a characteristic function φ∗
g
which diﬀers from φg in that residual players do not sever existing links in order to ”punish”
the blocking coalition. It follows that claims are higher under φ∗
g than under φg.T h e
characteristic function φ∗
g is derived by looking at the value generated by the blocking coalition






17The next example shows that stable allocation may fail to exist in this case:








with ε>0. The function v satisﬁes positive spillovers. Considering the disjoint coalitions
(1) and (23), we obtain:
φ∗
g(2) + φ∗
g(13) = 4 > 3=v(N,{N}),
showing that φ∗
g is not superadditive. Also, it can be checked that no allocation exists that
meet the claims of both player 2 and of coalition 13.¥
In this example, the lack of stable allocation is generated by the strong incentives to free
ride, due to the presence of positive spillovers. In such games, the harshest punishment for the
blocking coalition is the disintegration of the residual organization, which is here prevented
by the existing links, and is, in contrast, allowed under φ and φg.
The same problem does not arise under negative spillovers. In fact, the structure π(g|N\S)
induced by the coalition S is the coarsest structure allowed to the players in N\S by the
deﬁnition of φg, and therefore the harshest punishment for S. The same result derived for
the function φg for all partition functions extends therefore here for the class of functions
with negative spillovers. This is stated as point i) of the next proposition. In point ii) we
establish a property for games with positive spillovers, reaﬃrming the role of hierarchies for
stability even in this class of games.
Proposition 2 i) Let v be cohesive and exhibit negative spillovers and let g be a tree. For
all hierarchies (g,r) the associated hierarchical outcome is blocked by no team. ii) Let v be
fully cohesive and exhibit positive spillovers. For all organizations g0 containing cycles, if the
allocation ¯ u is blocked by no team in g0,t h e nu i sb l o c k e db yn ot e a mi na l lt h es p a n n i n gt r e e s
of g0.
18Proof. i) Proposition 1 has shown that no team in g blocks the hierarchical outcome when
φg is the characteristic function. Letting u denote the hierarchical outcome, this means that
for all teams S ⊂ N we have:


















Since πN\S ∈ Π
g
N\S implies that πN\S is a subpartition of π(g|N\S), given the negative
spillovers of v we can write for all teams S:
φ∗


















ii) Consider any non hierarchical organization g0,w h i c h ,b yd e ﬁnition, is not minimally con-
nected (that is, contains cycles). Suppose that g0 admits a stable allocation when coalitional
claims are given by φ∗
g. This means that for each connected coalition S ∈ CC(g0)w eh a v e
P
i∈S ui ≥ φ∗
g(S). Consider now any spanning tree g of g0.C l e a r l y ,w eh a v eCC(g) ⊆ CC(g0).
This means that all coalitions that have the ability to object to g can also object to g0.A l s o ,
by the full cohesiveness assumption, we need not worry about any partition πS,s i n c eS will
always stay united. Since for each S ∈ CC(g) each component of g0|N\S is either a component
of g|N\S or can be obtained by merging two or more components of g|N\S, it follows that
the partition π(S,g0)m u s tc o n c e n t r a t et h ep a r t i t i o nπ (S,g). Positive spillovers imply that
φ∗
g(S) ≤ φ∗
g0(S). We conclude that the stability of g0 directly implies the stability of g.
Point ii) in Proposition 2 shows that, under positive spillovers, the set of allocations which
are stable for at least one hierarchical structure includes all allocations which are stable for
at least one arbitrary organization. This property does not extend to games with negative
spillovers both under the functions φg and φ∗
g. The reason is that, under these functions,
adding links to a hierarchy (thereby creating cycles) has two eﬀects: it enlarges the set
of connected coalitions and it induces (weakly) more concentrated coalition structure after
all objections. While both eﬀects decrease the stability of the organization under positive
spillovers (from which the result of proposition 2), they move in opposite directions under
negative spillovers, where a larger set of connected coalitions possess weaker incentives to
object. In this latter case, non hierarchical organizations may well sustain stable allocations
which are objected in all hierarchies (including those generated by the spanning trees).
194 Conclusions
We have studied the stability of collective decisions when players are organized in a hierarchy
and coalitional payoﬀ possibilities are described by a partition function. Our analysis has built
on the work of Demange (2004), with which it shares the basic assumption that the hierarchy
limits the ability to block collective decisions to the set of coalitions that are internally
connected (the set of ”teams”). We have shown that if blocking coalitions have ”pessimistic
expectations” about the reaction of residual players, then Demange’s stability result carry
over to all games in partition function form. If players form ”passive expectations”, then a
stable allocation exists in all games with negative spillovers, but may fail to exist if spillovers
are positive. In the latter case, however, hierarchies are still the most stable organizational
form, since the set of allocations that are stable within a hierarchy include all allocations
that are stable in at least one arbitrary organizational form.
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